I. Introduction
The competitive environment for Indonesia's manufacturing industries has changed a great deal in the years following the Asian economic crisis. The major factors in the global environment that have adversely affected Indonesia's competitive-ness in its manufactured exports include increasing economic openness, shorter product cycles, and continuous technological improve-ments (World Bank 2003, p. 4) . For countries, like Indonesia, which are highly dependent on foreign trade and therefore Malaysia, and Thailand; the expiry of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) in early 2005; trade liberalization within the ASEAN countries; and the WTO-mandated reduction in tariff barriers (World Bank 2003, p. 3) .
This paper discusses Indonesia's low industrial competitiveness and the steps which could be taken to remedy this problem. A brief overview will first be given of Indonesia's industrial development before and after the Asian economic crisis. This will be important to understand why Indonesia's industrial competitiveness is relatively low compared with its competitors in the region.
II. Indonesia's Industrial Development before and after the Asian Economic Crisis: An Overview

II.1 Industrial Development during the Soeharto Era
During the thirty-two years of "New Order" rule the Indonesian economy experienced rapid and sustained growth, which enabled Indonesia to graduate from the ranks of one of the poorest countries in the mid-1960s to one of the eight "high-performing Asian economies" (HPAEs) in the early 1990s, along with Japan, the four "Asian Tigers", and Indonesia's two Southeast Asian neighbours, Malaysia and Thailand (World Bank 1993, pp. 1, 37) .
Rapid economic growth averaging 7.0 per cent during the period 1965-97 was driven by the expansion of the three main sectors of the economy, namely, agriculture, manufacturing, and services. As the manufacturing sector throughout this period was growing at double digits, much faster than the two other sectors which were growing at single digits, the Indonesian economy underwent a rapid transformation, as reflected by the rapid rise in the relative importance of the manufacturing sector (Table 1) . By 1991 manufacturing's contribution to GDP exceeded the contribution of the agricultural sector (Aswicahyono 1997, p. 25) .
During the late 1960s and early 1970s Indonesia's rapid industrial growth was fuelled by the liberalization of economic policies, and the return to normal economic conditions after the political turmoil and economic chaos of the early 1960s. During the oil boom period rapid industrial growth was facilitated by protectionist import-substituting policies. During this oil boom era the liberal economic policies were largely replaced by more interventionist policies, when the Indonesian government, flush with windfall revenues from the oil booms, initiated an ambitious, second phase importsubstitution policy after the "easy" phase of import-substitution had been completed by the mid-1970s (McCawley 1979, p. 13) . This second phase of import-substituting industrialization involved the establishment of various upstream, state-owned, basic industries.
Even though many Indonesian and foreign economists were concerned about this costly and inefficient pattern of upstream import-substituting industrialization, which largely ignored comparison of production costs with border prices (Gray 1982, p. 41) , the large oil boom revenues enabled the Indonesian government to ignore their criticisms. However, by 1983 the end of the oil boom forced the Indonesian government to shift to export-promoting policies by introducing a series of deregulation measures to improve the investment climate for private, including foreign, investors to encourage them to invest in exportoriented projects. These deregulation measures also included a series of trade reforms to reduce the anti-export bias of the protectionist trade regime, including the introduction of a duty exemption and drawback scheme in May 1986. This scheme provided export-oriented firms with the opportunity to purchase inputs, whether actually imported or locally made, at international prices. This scheme turned out to be a crucial factor in facilitating the rapid growth of manufactured exports.
The trade reforms and the reintroduction of liberal foreign investment policies, combined with a supportive exchange rate policy aimed at keeping the real effective exchange rate at a competitive level, and underpinned by sound macroeconomic policies, proved to be successful. As a result of the surge in manufactured exports, Indonesia's manufacturing sector, specifically the non-oil and gas manufacturing sub-sector, by the late 1980s emerged as the country's major engine of economic growth (World Bank 1994, p. 1) and major source of export revenues. During the period 1985-88 the manufacturing sector grew at an average annual rate of 13 per cent, while manufactured exports grew at an average annual rate of 27 per cent. During the period 1989-92 the manufacturing sector surged at a much faster rate of 22 per cent, while manufactured exports continued to grow at an average of 27 per cent (Dhanani 2000, p. 28) . Since 1993, however, up to the crisis year of 1997 the growth of the manufacturing sector slowed down to an average 12 per cent, while manufactured exports grew only at a sluggish 7 per cent (Dhanani 2000, p. 28) .
The slowdown in the growth of manufactured exports was in a sense understandable, since these exports started from a narrow base in the mid1980s. Nevertheless, this slowdown aroused concern among Indonesia's economic policymakers that Indonesia was losing its export competitiveness and that this might adversely affect the prospects of sustained rapid economic growth. One indication of the loss of export competitiveness was the loss of market share of Indonesia's textile and garment exports in 1993-94 in the non-quota markets where Indonesia's exports faced head on the competition from other exporting countries (James 1995, pp. 23-25) .
To study the sustainability of manufactured export growth, the Indonesian government commissioned some studies to look into this problem. In a study on the "Prospects for Manufactured Exports During Repelita VI" conducted by the Harvard Institute of International Development (HIID) in 1995 for the Department of Industry and Trade, the HIID report found that Indonesia was behind its international competitors in laying the foundation for developing skill-and capital-intensive exports (HIID 1995, p. 7) . Like these countries, for Indonesia the only basis for modernizing the export base was to achieve continued gains in the productivity of workers, capital, and the firms themselves (HIID 1995, p. 1) . Hence, the challenge facing Indonesia's manufacturing sector was to achieve a sustained increase in total factor productivity (TFP).
TFP growth rates in Indonesian manufacturing are greatly affected by the policy environment as indicated by the findings of studies by Hill, Aswicahyono, and Bird (1997) , and Timmer (1997) ( Table 2) .
The study by Hill, Aswicahyono, and Bird (1997) found that TFP growth rates in Indonesian manufacturing varied according to three distinct policy periods, namely the period of importsubstituting industrialization during the oil boom , the immediate post-oil boom period when existing policies were reassessed , and the period marked by a more decisive shift to export-promotion policies . Average annual TFP'growth was low during the first period, then rose during the second period, and then rose faster during the third period (Hill, Aswicahyono, and Bird 1997, p. 78) . Evidently, the more favourable policy environment since the mid-1980s had a positive impact on TFP growth.
A more recent study by Marcel Timmer on aggregate TFP growth in Indonesian manufacturing came up with largely similar findings. Subdividing the period studied into five-year intervals, Timmer found, like Hill, Aswicahyono, and Bird, that average annual TFP growth rate was low during the import-substituting phase of the late 1970s to early 1980s. However, after the policy reforms since the mid-1980s TFP growth accelerated steeply in the late 1980s (Timmer 1999, pp. 84-87) . During the first half of the 1990s, TFP growth declined again, although it was still higher than during the import-substitution phase of the late 1970s to early 1980s.
The differences between the estimates of Hill, Aswicahyono, and Bird and of Timmer on TFP growth, including on the period 1986-91, are largely due to the way the factor inputs, notably the capital stock, were measured and the extent and scope of quality improvements were accounted for. This in turn was dependent on the availability and choice of data, with the greatest problem lying in the measurement of physical and human capital (Timmer 1999, p. 76) .
Despite the soundness of the recommendations in the HIID report, the government had on the eve of the Asian economic crisis not yet completed the necessary deregulation of international trade, including further tariff reductions and relaxation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which would have reduced the production costs of manufacturing firms and raised their international competitiveness (World Bank 1997, p. 112) . In addition, extensive regulations and restrictions on domestic competition also added to the costs of doing business in Indonesia, thereby further reducing the efficiency of private firms (World Bank 1997, p. 118) .
One major reason why by 1997 the Indonesian government had not yet taken the necessary steps, obvious to economists, to further deregulate international trade and lift the policy-generated barriers to domestic competition, was the influence of well-connected, vested interests. These interests had benefited from the rents created by the barriers to import and domestic competition. Another reason why the government did not take the necessary steps to raise the country's industrial competitiveness, as suggested by the HIID and other studies, was the political influence of Dr B. J. Habibie, the powerful Minister of State for Research and Technology. Unlike most economists, Habibie, an aeronautic engineer by training, argued that Indonesia should no longer depend on labour-intensive industries, which in his view were sunset industries, the international competitiveness of which were declining (Thee 1998, p. 33) . To compensate for the decline of these sunset industries, Habibie advocated the development of strategic industries, including the state-owned, hi-tech aircraft industry, which in his view would yield more foreign exchange earnings than the sunset industries. To develop these strategic industries, they needed to be temporarily protected and subsidized (Thee 1998, p. 133 ).
Habibie's views were criticized by economists, who argued that these costly strategic industries, particularly the aircraft assembling industry, were imposing high social opportunity costs on the country. However, because of Habibie's strong influence on President Soeharto, his views prevailed. Hence, during the 1990s up to the crisis of 1997/98 the Indonesian government pursued a dual track industrial policy by pursuing a "broad spectrum" policy of outward-looking industrialization, as advocated by a more exportoriented Department of Industry and Trade, and the promotion of Habibie's strategic industries (Thee and Pangestu 1998, p. 262) .
II.2 Industrial Development after the Asian Economic Crisis
After the Asian economic crisis, growth of Indonesia's manufacturing sector slowed down sharply. While manufacturing in 1996 had grown at almost 12 per cent, it slowed to 5.3 per cent in 1997 and in 1998 contracted by -11.4 per cent (Table 3) .
Although manufacturing growth recovered to a sluggish 3.9 per cent in 1999 and to 6. To some extent, the sluggish growth of manufacturing after 2000 was due to the lower output of the oil and gas industries, specifically the petroleum refineries. It should be borne in mind that the relative importance of the oil and gas industries after the end of the oil boom era in 1982 has steadily declined. In 2002, the oil and gas manufacturing sub-sector accounted for only 11 per cent of the non-oil and -gas manufacturing sub-sector.
Looking at the performance of the non-oil and -gas industries, which generated the bulk of the surge of non-oil exports since the late 1980s through 1996, we see that the growth of the nonoil and gas manufacturing sub-sector also declined steadily from a high of 7 per cent in 2000 to 4 per cent or less from 2001 through 2003. However, in 2004 the non-oil and gas manufacturing sub-sector grew at 7.5 per cent, which was the highest rate after the crisis. However, in 2005 growth of the non-oil and gas manufacturing sector declined again because of the adverse impact of higher fuel prices and interest rates. This is a matter of concern, since rapid growth of the manufacturing sector, driven by rapid growth of manufactured exports, have fuelled economic growth and created new jobs. At present the prospects for rapid growth of the manufacturing sector, particularly manufactured exports, are still cloudy because of various adverse domestic factors rather than external factors. Four adverse factors in particular account for the postcrisis sluggish growth of manufactured exports. These are the decline in cost competitiveness, decline in investment, increased international competition and poor trade facilitation (World Bank 2004, pp. ii-iii) .
II.2.1 Loss in Cost
Competitiveness. The stronger rupiah and higher domestic cost inflation, including higher labour costs, have eroded Indonesia's competitiveness in the world markets. According to an IMF estimate, the unit labour costs in U.S. dollars, a key indicator of competitiveness, are now 35 per cent higher than before the crisis. This adverse development has eroded the competitiveness of Indonesia's labourintensive exports. This rise in unit labour costs is caused by the steady rise in minimum wages which have exceeded the rise in labour productivity.
II.2.2 Decline in Investment.
Indonesia's investment climate has deteriorated considerably after the demise of the New Order, and now ranks as one of the worst in the East Asian region. This poor investment climate has deterred new investments, particularly foreign direct investment (FDI), which is important for product upgrading and generating new manufactured exports and new jobs.
II.2.3 Increased International Competition.
In recent years China and Vietnam have emerged as strong competitors to Indonesia, since they export the same low-skill labour-intensive products. While Indonesia's key exports, such as fabrics and footwear, experienced a decline, both China and Vietnam recorded a rapid growth in these manufactured exports. In Japan, which was not a signatory to the Multi-Fibre Agreement ( 
II.2.4 Poor Trade Facilitation.
Port and other infrastructure bottlenecks, such as congested highways to the ports and occasional blackouts of electricity, substantially raise the domestic costs of manufactured exports. After the Asian economic crisis Indonesia's physical infrastructure has greatly deteriorated because of the decline in public investment. Although responsibility for maintaining physical infrastructure has partly been handed over to the regional governments since the introduction of regional autonomy in early 2001, implementation has been patchy because of illdefined co-ordination arrangements and divisions of authority between the central and regional governments (Bird and Hill 2006, p. 369) .
Because of the low efficiency of Indonesia's ports, including the Jakarta International Container Terminal (JICT), the main container terminal of Tanjung Priok, Indonesia's largest port, virtually all of'Indonesia's container traffic is transshipped through Singapore and Malaysia. According to World Bank estimates, Indonesia could increase its exports by 18 per cent if port logistics and procedures were just half as efficient as in the average APEC country (World Bank 2004, p. iii) .
To increase Indonesia's exports, the government should therefore focus its efforts on tackling the above adverse factors, including efforts to lower the costs of exporters; improve the investment climate for private, including foreign, investors, by improving governance, particularly in the judiciary, tax and custom offices; assisting exporters in penetrating new export markets; and tackling the port and other infrastructure bottlenecks.
III. Some Assessments of Indonesia's Technological Competence
Although Indonesia's rapid industrial transformation during the past three decades has been accompanied by technological upgrading, as reflected by rising TFP levels (Table 2 ) since the mid-1980s, the development of Indonesia's industrial technological capabilities (ITCs) has lagged behind that of the Asian Tigers, particularly Korea and Taiwan, and even behind the two other East Asian NIEs, Malaysia and Thailand. Improved technological capabilities are crucial to sustain Indonesia's manufactured export growth.
Indonesia's low industrial technological capabilities (ITCs) is, amongst others, reflected by the low percentage of its high technology manufactured exports, as compared to those of the other East Asian countries (Table 4) .
Although definitions of what constitute high technology exports are not perfect, since they also include assembled products with low local valueadded, such as consumer electronics, they can serve as a rough indicator of a country's technological competence. Hence, the data in Table 5 which show the much lower percentage of Indonesia's high technology manufactured exports as compared with those of the other East Asian countries indicate how far Indonesia still has to go in developing technology-and skill-intensive products.
Indonesia's relatively low ITCs have also been confirmed by qualitative, firm-level surveys conducted by international consulting firms (for example, SRI International 1992) and academic economists. In a comparative study sponsored by UNCTAD's Technology Programme on the link between manufactured exports and technological capabilities in Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam (Ernst, Ganiatsos, and Mytelke 1998) . This comparative study indicated that Indonesia's ITCs, even in export-oriented manufacturing firms, were still limited to the basic production or operational capabilities required for the smooth functioning of the plants and, to a lesser extent, to adaptive or minor change capabilities, specifically in regard to introducing minor changes in process technologies to adapt to local conditions. None of Indonesia's firms, however, had as yet developed the more demanding innovative (major change) capabilities that enable firms to make major changes in process or product technologies. Development of these latter capabilities, the study concluded, was essential to the ability of Indonesian firms to achieve and maintain international competitiveness (Thee and Pangestu 1998).
In a critical assessment of Indonesia's technology policies, Sanjaya Lall pointed out the relatively low level of Indonesia's ITCs. Lall observed that Indonesia's industrial structure had several weaknesses in terms of technology. These weaknesses, if not overcome, would hamper Indonesia's long-term industrial growth and upgrading (Lall 1998, p. 136) . Among the technological weaknesses cited were the shallow and backward technological base, particularly compared to that of the East Asian Tigers; weak and narrow domestic capabilities for absorbing and improving complex imported technologies; an underdeveloped capital goods sector; and the relatively small amount of technological effort, which was concentrated and distorted (because of the focus on the highly subsidized and protected hi-tech industries promoted by Dr Habibie (Lall 1998, p. 136) .
In the following sections the policies to enhance Indonesia's industrial competitiveness through improved technological capabilities will be discussed.
IV. Raising Indonesia's Industrial Competitiveness through Industrial Technological Development
International experience, particularly of the East Asian NIEs, has indicated that raising Indonesia's export competitiveness requires the effective development of technological and associated managerial capabilities. Developing these technological capabilities does not mean innovation in the sense of "reinventing the wheel" to create technologies that are available elsewhere, often at lower cost. It does mean learning to use existing technologies efficiently, a daunting task (Lall and Weiss 2003, p. 4) .
Developing these technological capabilities is particularly important for raising Indonesia's export competitiveness, since thus far its manufactured exports have mainly consisted of resource-and low-skill labour-intensive products, which generally involve less effort, risk, and externalities. Although Indonesia for the foreseeable future still retains a comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactured exports because of its large labour surplus, there is general agreement that technology development is crucial to raise the efficiency and international competitiveness of Indonesia's manufacturing industries and sustain the growth of these International experience has shown that an industrial technology development strategy requires that certain basic and enabling conditions have to be met (World Bank 1996, pp. 2-5; Lall 1992, pp. 165-86; Hill 2001, pp. 6-9) .
The basic conditions for industrial technology development in Indonesia are:
1. The pursuit of sound macroeconomic policies, as low inflation encourages firms to make long-term investments in technology development; 2. The pursuit of pro-competition economic policies, since a competitive environment is conducive to drive firms to invest more in technology upgrading to raise their competitiveness; 3. The upgrading of the quality of human resources, which is imperative for technology development (World Bank 1996, p. ii).
In addition to these basic conditions, a number of enabling conditions should be met through policies that:
1. Improve Indonesia's access to foreign technologies, including through FDI, as a tool for technology development; 2. Improve the availability of adequate finance for technology development; 3. Improve the effectiveness and performance of the technology support services (World Bank 1996, p. i).
Sound macroeconomic policies and procompetition policies shape the incentive system facing manufacturing firms to encourage them to invest in technology development. On the other hand the upgrading of human resources as well as the access to foreign technologies, finance and technology support services determine the supplyside capabilities of these firms. The policies to meet the basic and enabling conditions are discussed below.
IV.1 The Basic Conditions
IV.1.1 Pursuing Sound Macroeconomic Policies.
From the outset, the New Order government under General, later President, Soeharto (1966-98) put a high priority on pursuing sound macroeconomic policies. After the reckless deficit-financing policies of President Sukarno which led to hyperinflation in the mid-1960s, the New Order government realized that maintaining macroeconomic stability was crucial to encourage firms to undertake the long-term capital investments necessary for rapid and sustained economic growth. Hence, during the Soeharto era Indonesia's record on controlling inflation has been fairly good, although Indonesia's inflation during the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s was always slightly higher than that of its East Asian neighbours, except for the Philippines (Hill 1996, p. 7) .
Macroeconomic stability in 1997/98 was severely disrupted because of the Asian economic crisis. As a result of the steep depreciation of the rupiah, inflation rose steeply to 80 per cent in early 1998. However, in the course of 1998 the hyperinflation was gradually brought under control because of tight monetary policies (Hill 1999, p. 29) .
Whatever the political differences between the post-Soeharto governments (Habibie, Abdurrachman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and currently Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), all these governments realized the great importance of sound macroeconomic policies to maintain macroeconomic stability. 
IV.1.2 Pursuing Pro-competition Economic
Policies. The experience of the East Asian NIEs has shown that a competitive environment for firms has been an important prerequisite for technology upgrading. In these countries competition has been an important stimulus to drive firms to invest in their technological development (World Bank 1996, p. 3).
The overall competitive environment is determined by the foreign trade regime and domestic competition. After the end of the oil boom era 1982 the New Order government introduced a series of trade reforms to reduce the anti-export bias of the protectionist trade regime. These trade reforms included a gradual but steady reduction in tariff protection and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), specifically quantitative import restrictions, and a duty exemption and drawback scheme for export-oriented firms, which proved to be effective in encouraging firms to export. However, by the time the New Order government had introduced its last trade reforms in early 1997, remaining import protection still accounted for a lower, though still significant anti-export bias of the trade regime (Thee 1998, pp. 118-19) .
While the trade reforms from the mid-1980s through 1996 led to greater import competition, domestic competition and trade were still subject to extensive regulations and restrictions introduced by the central and provincial governments, and occasionally by officially sanctioned trade and industry associations (Thee 2002, p. 332). These restrictions took many forms, including entry controls, price controls, provisions for public sector dominance, the sanctioning of cartels, and ad hoc interventions favouring specific firms or sectors (Iqbal 1995, p. 14) .
Only after the Asian economic crisis was the Indonesian government forced, as part of its first agreement with the IMF in early November 1997, to lift the policy-generated barriers to domestic competition and trade. In its second agreement with the IMF in January 1998, a wider range of structural reforms were included, which provided for a further deregulation of the foreign trade and foreign investment regimes as well as the domestic competition regime (Thee 2002, p. 332) .
Aside from the deregulation policies to promote competition in the local and national markets, in early 1999 the new Indonesian government under President Habibie enacted a competition law, the Law Banning Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Competition. This competition law was intended to protect and maintain free and open market competition by preventing anti-competitive business practices by firms. With this competition law, Indonesia had in place, at least on paper, a comprehensive competition policy, encompassing both the various deregulation measures and a competition law (Thee 2002, p. 333) .
Since the appointment of a Business Competition Supervisory Commission in late 1996, many cases, particularly bid rigging or closed tenders, have already been investigated by this Commission. While some of its decisions have been criticized, it has been quite active in pursuing and investigating cases where anticompetitive business conduct was suspected.
Unfortunately, the deregulation policies of the recent past have been offset by the proliferation of new regulations by local governments since regional autonomy was introduced in early 2001. Many of these regulations restrict or tax trade within or between districts (kabupaten) and provinces. Obviously, these taxes and restrictions interfere in domestic trade and undermine domestic competition and internal market efficiency (World Bank 2005, p. 41). Hence, in terms of domestic competition, the new local restrictions on domestic trade and competition have undermined the pro-competition policies of recent years.
IV.1.3 Expanding Education and Upgrading the Quality of Human Resources.
A well-trained labour force, an effective training system, good quality science and engineering faculties of universities, and good management training programmes are key elements for sustaining Indonesia's industrial technology development (World Bank 1996, p. ii). Despite the progress in expanding education during the Soeharto era, Indonesia's record in education, as reflected by its public expenditures on education and gross enrolment ratios at all levels of education, is generally still inferior compared to that of its Southeast Asian neighbours and South Korea (Table 5) . Aside from this, the quality of Indonesia's education at all levels is generally inferior to that of its East Asian neighbours.
The data in Table 5 show that Indonesia is far behind its Southeast Asian neighbours and South Korea in terms of its public expenditures on education and participation in education, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels.
Aside from the fact that Indonesia's public expenditure on human resource development is even lower than the average low income country, let alone the average middle-income country, the current education and training system in general does not meet the needs of industry. The reason is that the general secondary education system relies on rote learning, and does not develop adequate mastery of basic literacy, basic numeracy, and thinking and creative skills. Hence, high school graduates are not adequately equipped with the knowledge and skills required for a more complex and diversified manufacturing sector, and also cannot take advantage from on-the-job training (Dhanani 2000, p. 11) .
Moreover, the senior secondary technical vocational schools, two-thirds of which are privately funded and operated, are poorly staffed and equipped, and thus do not equip the graduates with adequate practical knowledge. Postsecondary vocational technical education, on the other hand, is mainly provided by the government (Dhanani 2000, p. 11) , which currently lacks the resources to expand education and improve the quality of education, particularly technical education.
Indonesia's record in health too lags behind that of its East Asian neighbours, as reflected by some indicators on health expenditure and the health status of its population (Table 6 ).
The data in Table 6 show that public expenditure on health as a percentage of total health expenditure is the lowest in Indonesia as compared to that of its East Asian neighbours. Not surprisingly, the incidence of tuberculosis in Indonesia, for instance, is, together with the Philippines, one of the highest in East Asia. Life expectance at birth in Indonesia is also the lowest in East Asia. Interestingly, however, the prevalence of undernourishment in Indonesia is lower than in the Philippines and Thailand.
Aside from the above basic conditions required to promote industrial technology development, (Chen 1983, p. 63) . In view of the economic importance of these imported technologies, it is important to identify the major channels through which these technologies have been transferred to Indonesia, particularly to its manufacturing sector. Studies on international technology transfer in Indonesia's manufacturing sector indicate that (i) foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) technical licensing agreements, (iii) capital goods imports and the related transfer of skills by technical experts of foreign supplier firms, and (iv) the technical and marketing assistance by foreign buyers who acted as consultants to export-oriented firms, have been the major channels for international technology transfer to Indonesia (Thee 2005, pp. 218-19) .
i. Foreign direct investment (FDI).
While Indonesia since the early 1990s through 1996 experienced sizeable net FDI inflows, after the Asian economic crisis it experienced net FDI outflows which persisted through 2003. This development was in sharp contrast to developments in Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea which, although also hard hit by the Asian economic crisis, did not experience net FDI outflows, but in fact experienced rising net FDI inflows (Table 7) .
Even the positive net FDI inflow which Indonesia experienced in 2004 was much smaller than the large net FDI inflows during the late 1980s through 1996. This positive figure was also caused by the fact that Bank Indonesia has recently included privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), specifically the sale of these SOEs to foreign investors, and bank restructuring, specifically the sale of distressed banks to foreign investors, as part of FDI inflows.
The lack of interest of foreign investors to undertake new greenfield investments after the Asian economic crisis can be attributed to Indonesia's poor investment climate, which currently ranks among the worst in the East Asian region. Various factors account for this poor investment climate, including the lack of legal certainty and adequate law enforcement; labour problems, mainly caused by a business-unfriendly labour law enacted in 2003; confusion about overlapping authorities between the central and regional governments caused by the regional autonomy introduced in early 2001; widespread corruption which raise the costs of doing business in Indonesia; and crumbling physical infrastructure due to the lack of proper maintenance after the Asian economic crisis. The net effect of these problems is uncertainty, higher costs and many demands for bribes (World Bank 2003, p. 29) .
The fact that a small amount of FDI only flowed into Indonesia since 2004, while Korea and Thailand, the two other East Asian countries worst affected by the Asian economic crisis, already experienced rising net FDI inflows in 1998, meant that these two latter countries experienced not only a strengthening of their currencies, but also an acceleration of much-needed corporate restructuring, and important infusions of new technologies and modern management methods (World Bank 2000, p. 6). Indonesia, on the other hand, was unable to obtain these benefits, as FDI instead flowed out of the country.
ii. Technical licensing agreements. In Indonesia a major "unpackaged" (non-equity) mode of technology transfer from advanced country firms to Indonesian firms has been technical licensing agreements (TLAs). Although no quantitative data are available on the number of these TLAs, circumstantial evidence indicates that these TLAs often involve the transfer of older and mature technologies that do not offer the recipient country a long-term competitive advantage in the global market (Marks 1999, p. 6) . However, for a lateindustrializing economy like Indonesia, acquiring and mastering these older technologies first is a good way to develop the important basic industrial technological capabilities (ITCs), namely the production, investment and adaptive capabilities.
iii. Imports of capital goods and the transfer of skills by technical experts of foreign supplier firms. Imports of capital goods provide another way of acquiring the means of production without the transactional costs involved in FDI or TLAs (Dahlman, Ross-Larson, and Westphal 1987, p. 768) . Capital goods imports are actually embodied technology flows entering a country. They introduce into the production processes new machinery, other capital equipment and components that incorporate technologies which do not always incorporate high or frontier technologies, but are nevertheless new to the recipient firm (Soesastro 1998, p. 304) .
These imported capital goods can be a cheap way of developing local TCs if they can be used as models for reverse engineering to produce the machines locally (Dahlman, Ross-Larson, and Westphal 1987, p. 768) . However, Indonesian firms have in general not engaged in reverse engineering on a large scale to develop their ITCs, as Korean firms have done. However, the import Table 7 .2 (Indonesia), Table 8 .2 (Malaysia), Table 11 .2 (Thailand), and Table 5 .2 (South Korea).
of capital goods, particularly modern machinery, is often accompanied by technical advice provided by technical experts of the foreign supplier firm to the employees of the local firm on how to properly maintain or repair the machinery. In this way the import of capital goods contribute to the development of local technological capabilities.
iv. Technical assistance by foreign buyers. Since the mid-1970s an important informal channel of international technology transfer for Indonesian firms, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), has been provided by their participation in world trade, specifically through exporting their products. This informal channel was utilized effectively by local firms, particularly electronics firms, in the four East Asian NIEs, including Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore which, based on low wage rates, were able to build up basic operational (production) capabilities through simple assembly of mature products for exports, often developed through technical assistance provided by foreign buyers (Hobday 1994, p. 335; World Bank 1996, p. 4) . These local NIE firms successfully coupled export and technological development, allowing export market needs (the needs and design and product specifications of their overseas buyers) to focus their investment in technological upgrading and to provide a channel for them to acquire foreign technologies from their overseas buyers. This process of coupling exports with technology development has been referred to as "export-led technology development" (Hobday 1994, p. 335) .
Although not as technologically advanced as the East Asian NIEs's export-led technology development, the remarkable export performance which the garment industry and other export industries in Bali and Jepara, Central Java, have experienced since the mid-1970s is somewhat similar to the experience of these East Asian firms. The remarkable growth of Bali's export industries, starting with the garment industry in the mid1970s, and subsequently the silver jewelry, wood carving, quilting, leather products, bamboo furniture, ceramics, and stone carving industries, was based on vital information flows which these Balinese firms, received through strategic business alliances with foreign firms and businessmen (Cole 1998, p. 257) .
Through the vital information transfer and technical and managerial assistance (for instance on designs and plant layout, advice on the purchase of the most appropriate machines, and strict quality control) provided by the foreign buyers who often also acted as technical consultants to the largely small Balinese firms, these firms were able to achieve high levels of efficiency and accuracy. This assistance was provided on a for-profit basis, as it was specifically tied to tangible product output results (Cole 1998, p. 275; Thee and Hamid 1997) . The ongoing interaction of these two parties started a virtuous cycle of technological improvements and learning that was self-replicating and largely selffinancing, and which led to rapid and sustained export growth (Cole 1998, p. 275) .
IV.2.2 The Availability of Finance for
Technology Development. Another important element of industrial technology development is the availability and access to finance. The availability and access to term finance for investments in technology upgrading would be facilitated if the capacity of the banking system to appraise such investments could be strengthened. In Indonesia the government during the late Soeharto era also attempted to improve the tax treatment of venture capital funds (World Bank 1996, p. iv) .
Unfortunately, even before the Asian economic crisis, finance for investments in technology development was scarce. Indonesia never had a financing firm for technology development as Korea had, namely the Korea Technology Development Corporation (KCTC) (World Bank 1996, p. 29) . A state-owned venture capital firm, the PT Bahana Pembinaan Usaha Indonesia (Bahana PUI), was mainly entrusted to guide and develop SMEs (FIAS 1996, p. 54) .
After surviving banks had recovered from the Asian economic crisis, the bulk of their loans have been provided for private consumption, which indeed has been the main driver of economic growth during the past few years. At present banks and non-financial institutions have provided large amounts of loans for housing loans and credit card lending. Bank consumer credit has grown rapidly since 2000, and in 2004 grew at an average yearon-year rate of over 30 per cent (Soesastro and Atje 2005, p. 35) . Under these conditions little is left to finance technology development, even if banks are willing to overcome their risk aversion. It is therefore not surprising that the bulk of R&D activities in the manufacturing sector are financed by the private firms themselves (Table 8 ).
The data in Table 8 show that even before the Asian economic crisis, the bulk of R&D funding was financed by the manufacturing firms themselves. After the crisis R&D funding by the firms themselves became even more important, both in absolute and in relative terms.
IV.2.3 Improve the Performance of Technology Support Services.
To assist firms to improve their technological capabilities, effective technology support services are needed. These technology support services include metrology, standards, testing, and quality support services (MSTQ services). These services include the dissemination of information on international standards and assistance to firms to get ISO 9000 certification. It also includes industrial extension services to assist firms to improve productivity, quality, product designs, and delivery times. Other important technology support services include technology information services to provide firms with information on best practices, that is globally competitive technologies (World Bank 1996, p. v) .
During the Soeharto era the performance of the available technology support services, particularly the MSTQ services, was rated as inadequate by many firms. To some extent this was caused by the fact that many firms did not realize that their products needed to conform to strict standards (for example, technical and sanitary standards) and performance requirements (for example, ISO 9000), both national and international, particularly if they wanted to enter export markets (Thee 1998, p. 127) .
The available technology support services, particularly the important MSTQ services, are public institutes. If these services were rated as inadequate before the Asian economic crisis, the range and quality of these public institutes have likely declined further after the crisis, as public funds to upgrade these services have been reduced. It has been suggested that these technology support services should be privatized, but it appears unlikely that at present the private sector is interested in taking charge of these services.
The performance of the public sector research institutes, consisting of the R&D institutes of the Department of Industry and the research institutes under the co-ordination of the Minister of Research and Technology, particularly the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the Agency for Technology Assessment and Application (BPPT), in developing Indonesia's ITCS is in general also not satisfactory. The twelve national R&D laboratories and several regional laboratories of the Department of Industry are primarily engaged in training and product testing and certification rather than in R&D, and have little or no linkages with industry. The staff is generally neither well trained nor highly motivated because of low salaries, while the laboratories operate with outdated equipment (Lall 1998, pp. 153-54) .
The laboratories of LIPI and BPPT are in general better funded and staffed than those of the Department of Industry. However, their contribution to technology development is also limited, since their R&D activities are supplyrather than demand-driven, and often lack behind world technological frontiers. For this reason they have not been able to establish linkages with private industry. The internal management and procedures of these institutes also tend be bureaucratic (Lall 1998, p. 154) . The performance of these public research institutes has hardly changed after the Asian economic crisis. In fact, because of the shortage of funds of the government, it has been difficult to improve the performance of these institutes. Because of the relatively low salaries, many researchers tend to moonlight instead of working full-time on research.
V. Conclusion
The above overview of the required basic and enabling conditions to encourage Indonesian firms to invest in their technological development to raise their competitiveness indicates that in general these conditions have not been adequately met. While sound macroeconomic policies have in general been pursued with great success, procompetition policies were only introduced to a limited degree through the liberalization of the trade and the foreign investment regimes. However, during the late Soeharto era various restrictions on domestic competition and trade were introduced which adversely affected the business environment for bona fide entrepreneurs.
Although in March 1999 an anti-monopoly and fair competition law was introduced, these procompetition policies have recently been undermined by new restrictions on domestic competition and trade introduced by various regional governments after the introduction of regional autonomy in early 2001. Because of these restrictions, the business environment has deteriorated again.
Human resource development in Indonesia has generally lagged behind its East Asian neighbours before the Asian economic crisis, and have lagged even farther after the Asian economic crisis. Technical education at the secondary and tertiary level has been inadequate in imparting to the students the necessary technical skills to support technological development. The health status of the Indonesian population is in general not as good as that of the populations in the other East Asian countries.
Indonesian firms have access to foreign technologies mainly through FDI, technical licensing agreements, capital goods imports, and exporting. However, in the past Indonesia has not been able to take sufficient advantage from the presence of foreign firms to promote industrial and technological upgrading. At present the lack of interest of foreign investors to invest in Indonesia because of the country's poor investment climate has prevented Indonesia from benefiting from the infusions of new technologies and advanced management methods. Although technical licensing agreements have been a good means to get access to foreign technologies, these purchased technologies are generally older, mature technologies. The import of capital goods has also been a good channel to get new embodied technology, the use of which can be enhanced by technical assistance provided by technicians of the foreign suppliers of these capital goods. Gaining access to new product designs, technologies and export markets through the advice and assistance of foreign buyers/consultants of Indonesian products has also been helpful to several exporting firms, including SMEs, in upgrading their technical performance. The downside of this development is the continuing reliance on foreign buyers/consultants for the introduction of new product designs, technologies, and access to foreign markets.
Although finance for industrial technological development is important to firms willing to invest in this development, the performance of the financial sector in providing loans to firms willing to invest in technology development was disappointing even before the Asian economic crisis. After the crisis the prospects for getting more finance from the financial sector have become worse, as risk-averse banks prefer to provide loans for consumption purposes or use their deposits to purchase Bank of Indonesia certificates which earn a high interest.
To assist firms to improve their technological capabilities, effective technology support services are needed. The available technology support services, including the important MSTQ services, are public institutes. These services were generally rated as inadequate before the Asian economic crisis. After the crisis the range and quality of these public institutes have likely declined further, since public funds to upgrade these services were reduced. For this reason it has been suggested to privatize these technology support services. However, it appears unlikely that at present the private sector is interested in running these services themselves.
The performance of the public research institutes, including the laboratories of the Department of Industry and the research institutes of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), in technology development has also not been satisfactory. The laboratories of the Department of Industry are poorly staffed and poorly funded and mostly equipped with obsolete equipment. The laboratories of LIPI and BPPT are better staffed and funded, but their research is mostly supply-rather than demand-driven. For this reason these research institutes have in general not been able to establish linkages with private industry.
The above overview of the state of basic and enabling conditions for industrial technology development in Indonesia indicates that in general these important conditions have not been fully met during the Soeharto era, and even less so after the Asian economic crisis. Besides a more serious and determined effort to improve the investment climate, the Indonesian government has to focus its industrial and technology policies on meeting the above conditions for industrial technological development, if it is serious in raising Indonesia's industrial competitiveness. However, these efforts have to be accompanied by a serious effort to tackle the various, mainly domestic, problems which are a burden to private industry, namely the loss in cost competitiveness, the poor investment climate, increased international competition, and the poor trade facilitation caused by port and other infrastructure bottlenecks. NOTE I would like to acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions of the two anonymous referees of this paper. However, I alone am responsible for shortcomings and errors in this paper.
